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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal from a District Court decision holding 
that a holiday display exhibited by Wall T ownship, New 
Jersey, did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. We hold that the plaintiffs lack standing 
under Article III to challenge the display to which they now 
object, and we therefore vacate the decision of the District 




Since at least 1997, Wall Township has exhibited a 
holiday display near the entrance to the municipal building 
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housing much of the Township's government. The 
individual plaintiffs in this case, Eleanor and Randy Miller, 
are taxpayers and residents of the T ownship and members 
of the organizational plaintiff, the American Civil Liberties 
Union of New Jersey ("ACLU"). The Millers fr equently visit 
the complex in which the municipal building sits for a 
variety of personal and professional reasons. 
 
In 1998, while visiting the complex, the Millers observed 
the Township's holiday display and found it objectionable. 
The display consisted principally of a creche with 
traditional figures, a lighted evergr een tree, two decorated 
urns that are part of the complex, and four snowman 
banners attached to light posts at the complex. 
 
On February 18, 1999, plaintiffs brought suit in the 
United States District Court for New Jersey, alleging that 
the display violated the United States and New Jersey 
Constitutions. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief. 
 
In July 1999, the Township moved to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint for lack of standing. The Court denied 
defendant's motion on October 5, 1999, finding that the 
plaintiffs possessed standing as a result of their "direct 
personal contact with the government-sponsor ed religious 
display" that has made them "feel less welcome, less 
accepted, tainted and rejected." 
 
In December 1999, the Township again exhibited a 
holiday display. The 1999 display was differ ent than the 
1998 display, however. In addition to a cr eche, the 1999 
display included a donated menorah, candy cane banners 
rather than the less prominent snowman banners, a larger 
evergreen tree, and two signs r eading: (1) "Through this and 
other displays and events through the year , Wall Township 
is pleased to celebrate our American cultural traditions, as 
well as our legacy of diversity and freedom" and (2) "Merry 
Christmas Happy Hanukkah." Second Affidavit of Randy 
Miller PP 5-6, 10-11 ("Mr. Miller II") (Appendix at A44-A45 
("App.")); Declaration of Joseph Verruni PP 5-6, 8 (App. at 
A59-A60); see also Declaration of Michael D. Fitzgerald 
PP 3-4 (App. at A53); Declaration of Michael D. Fitzgerald 
PP 3-4 (App. at A81-A82). 
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Mr. Miller observed the modified display on December 2, 
1999. On December 20, 1999, plaintiffs moved for a 
temporary restraining order and pr eliminary injunction. At 
a December 23, 1999 hearing, the Court denied plaintiffs' 
motion for a restraining order due to plaintiffs' delay in 
seeking relief and, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P . Rule 65, 
consolidated plaintiffs' motion for pr eliminary injunction 
with a future trial on the merits. 
 
In early 2000, the Township moved for summary 
judgment. The District Court invited and received 
additional evidence from the parties, including a January 
26, 2000 Township resolution directing the purchase of 
"twig-style reindeer and a sleigh" to add to the display and 
formalizing the future components of the display. 
 
Based on the evidence submitted and without a for mal 
trial, the District Court ruled on the merits of plaintiffs' suit 
on June 22, 2000. The Court found that the T ownship's 
holiday display, as modified and memorialized in the 2000 
resolution, did not violate the federal or New Jersey 
Constitutions and entered judgment for the T ownship. 
 
Plaintiffs appealed, contesting the District Court's 
consideration of the January 2000 resolution and the 
conclusion that the Township's display is constitutional. In 
their written and oral arguments, plaintif fs made clear that 




On appeal, the Township again asserts that plaintiffs 
lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
holiday display. We review the issue of standing de novo. 
See Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The standing requirement implicit in Article III "is not 
merely a troublesome hurdle to be overcome if possible so 
as to reach the `merits' of a lawsuit," but an integral part of 
the governmental charter established by the Constitution. 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476 
(1982). If plaintiffs do not possess Article III standing, both 
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the District Court and this Court lack subject matter 
jurisdiction to address the merits of plaintif fs' case. See id. 
at 475-76; Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); 
Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 344 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving standing. See Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Plaintiffs 
must carry that burden "in the same way as any other 
matter on which the plaintiff bears the bur den of proof, i.e., 
with the manner and degree of evidence r equired at 
successive stages of the litigation." Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561; 
see also FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common 
Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1996). As this appeal 
comes to us after full litigation on the merits, plaintiffs 
must establish standing in the same manner as would be 
required to prevail on the ultimate merits of their case. Cf. 
Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County, 4 F.3d 1412, 
1415 (7th Cir. 1993) ("At the summary judgment stage, the 
plaintiff must produce evidence [of standing] in the form of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) affidavits or documents . . . ."). 
 
The ACLU for its part rests its standing on the interests 
of its members, the Millers, rather than on an independent 
injury to the organization. As a result, the ACLU's ability to 
sue is strictly dependent on that of the Millers. See Valley 
Forge, 454 U.S. at 476 n.14; Fr eedom from Religion Found., 
Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1469 (7th Cir. 1988); 
American Civil Liberties Union v. City of St. Charles, 794 
F.2d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1986). The Millers claim standing 
based on their status as municipal taxpayers or on non- 
economic injuries resulting from the display. As we explain 





The Supreme Court recognized in Dor emus v. Board of 
Education of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952), that a 
municipal taxpayer may possess standing to litigate"a 
good-faith pocketbook action." See also Doe v. Beaumont 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[T]o 
establish . . . municipal taxpayer standing . . . a plaintiff 
must show only that (1) he pays taxes to the r elevant 
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entity, and (2) tax revenues are expended on the disputed 
practice."); Clay v. Fort Wayne Community Sch., 76 F.3d 
873, 879 (7th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging the good-faith 
pocketbook requirement adopted by Dor emus for municipal 
taxpayer standing); United States v. New Y ork, 972 F.2d 
464, 470 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[M]unicipal taxpayers have 
standing to challenge allegedly unlawful municipal 
expenditures.") (collecting cases); Cammack v. Waihee, 932 
F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he Doremus requirement 
of a pocketbook injury applies to municipal taxpayer 
standing . . . .") (collecting cases); District of Columbia 
Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F .2d 1, 4 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988) (same).1 
 
The plaintiffs in Doremus wer e state and municipal 
taxpayers who challenged a state law mandating Bible 
reading in public schools. Doremus , 342 U.S. at 430-31, 
433. The Supreme Court found that the plaintif fs failed to 
establish a direct monetary injury that would confer 
standing to raise such a challenge, as they did not allege 
that the Bible reading was "supported by any separate tax 
or paid for from any particular appropriation or that it adds 
any sum whatever to the cost of conducting the school." Id. 
at 433. Likewise, the plaintiffs failed to pr ovide any 
"information . . . as to what kind of taxes" they paid or to 
aver "that the Bible reading increase[d] any tax they [did] 
pay or that as taxpayers they are, will, or possibly can be 
out of pocket because of " the activity. Id. In short, the 
plaintiffs failed to establish more than a potential de 
minimis drain on tax revenues due to the challenged 
reading. See id. at 431-32; see also Doe v. Madison Sch. 
Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir . 1999) (en banc) 
(noting that "the school's expenditures for teachers' 
salaries, equipment, building maintenance, and the like 
were insufficient to confer taxpayer standing[in Doremus] 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The standing requirements for federal taxpayers are more stringent 
than those for municipal taxpayers. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 
U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968); 
Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d at 282; Board of Educ. of Mt. Sinai 
Sch. Dist. v. New York State Teachers Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d 106, 110 
(2d Cir. 1995); Hawley v. City of Cleveland, 773 F.2d 736, 741-42 (6th 
Cir. 1985); District of Columbia Common Cause, 858 F.2d at 3-4, 6-7. 
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despite their indirect support of the Bible r eading"). As a 
result, the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 
 
The same result has obtained in cases in other courts of 
appeals. In Doe v. Duncanville Independent School District, 
for example, the plaintiffs failed to show that the defendant 
school district spent any money on the distribution of 
Bibles by the Gideon Society in public school. Doe v. 
Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 
1995). The Gideons supplied the Bibles and placed them on 
a table in the school foyer. Id."[N]o school district employee 
handle[d] the Bibles," and "[t]her e [was] no evidence that 
the school district bought the table especially for the Bible 
distribution or that the table [had] been set aside for [that] 
sole purpose." Id. Recognizing that "[i]n order to establish 
. . . municipal taxpayer standing . . . , a plaintif f must not 
only show that he pays taxes to the relevant entity, he must 
also show that tax revenues are expended on the disputed 
practice," the Fifth Circuit found that plaintiffs lacked 
standing to challenge the Bible distribution. Id. at 408-09. 
 
The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in 
Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 
at 1466, in which plaintiffs sought to enjoin the display of 
a monument of the Ten Commandments in a park owned 
and maintained by the defendant city. While the city had 
spent money in 1899 to acquire the property for the park, 
the city had not spent any funds on maintaining the 
donated monument. Id. at 1465-66, 1470. The Seventh 
Circuit noted that "[a] plaintif f 's status as a municipal 
taxpayer is irrelevant for standing purposes if no tax money 
is spent on the allegedly unconstitutional activity" and 
concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. Id. at 
1470; see also Clay, 76 F.3d at 879 ("Municipal taxpayer 
status does not confer standing absent some allegation by 
the plaintiffs of an illegal use of tax r evenues."); Gonzales, 
4 F.3d at 1416 ("Without evidence of expenditure of tax 
revenues [on a donated, maintenance-fr ee crucifix in a 
public park], the plaintiffs cannot claim standing" as 
taxpayers.); City of St. Charles, 794 F .2d at 267-68 
(Plaintiffs' taxpayer status was irrelevant where there was 
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no allegation "that any part of the expense of the [disputed 
display of a lighted] cross [was] paid for out of tax revenues.").2 
 
In this case, plaintiffs have provided uncontradicted 
testimony that they pay property taxes to the T ownship. 
Affidavit of Eleanor Miller P 1 ("Mrs. Miller") (App. at A17); 
Affidavit of Randy Miller P 1 ("Mr . Miller I") (App. at A20). 
However, as in the cases above, plaintif fs have failed to 
establish that the Township has spent any money, much 
less money obtained through property taxes, on the 
religious elements of the 1999 display. 
 
Plaintiffs did allege, "[o]n infor mation and belief," that 
"the [1998] Nativity display was er ected and maintained 
with public funds including tax revenues collected by the 
Township." Complaint P 35 (App. at A6). However, the 
Township denied this allegation and plaintif fs presented no 
evidence on the issue. Answer P 35 (App. at A). Moreover, 
the record establishes that both the Nativity display and 
the menorah were donated to the Township. Complaint P 34 
(App. at A6); Answer P 34 (App. at A38); Declaration of 
Joseph Verruni P 5 (App. at A59). While the Township thus 
owns the Nativity display, and presumably the menorah, 
and the overall display is set up with defendant's support, 
direction and/or approval, the Township denies that it 
"maintains" the display. Complaint PP 34, 41 (App. at A6); 
Answer PP 34, 41 (App. at A38-A39). Plaintif fs have thus 
failed to establish an expenditure on the challenged 
elements of the display. 
 
Even if we were to assume that the holiday display was 
erected by paid Township employees, ther e is no indication 
that the portion of such expenditure attributable to the 
challenged elements of the display would have been more 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. For cases in which other circuits have r ecognized that municipal 
taxpayers lack standing to sue where ther e is no evidence of 
expenditure, see Madison School District No. 321, 177 F.3d at 794, 797 
(Even though tax money was allegedly spent on the"ordinary costs of 
graduation," such as printing programs, plaintiff lacked standing to 
challenge graduation prayer where she conceded that no tax funds were 
"spent solely on" that activity.), and District of Columbia Common Cause, 
858 F.2d at 4 ("[M]unicipal taxpayers do not have standing when no tax 
moneys are spent.") 
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than the de minimis expenditure that was involved in the 
Bible reading in Doremus. See Doremus v. Board of Educ. of 
Hawthorne, 71 A.2d 732, 733 (N.J. Super . Ct. Law Div. 
1950) (under statute in question Bible reading was to be 
performed by teacher or principal); Madison Sch. Dist. No. 
321, 177 F.3d at 794. Similarly, we cannot simply assume 
that the Township expends more than a de minimis 
amount in lighting the religious elements of the display. Cf. 
City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d at 267-68 (Lighting for 
challenged cross was "put up by the city's volunteer 
firemen, on their own time, and the minuscule cost of the 
electricity required to keep the lights lit [was] defrayed by 
voluntary contributions from city residents."). 
 
As a result, we cannot find that plaintif fs have carried 
their burden of proving an expenditur e of revenues to 
which they contribute that would make their suit"a good- 
faith pocketbook action." Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434; see 
also Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 1965) 
(requiring municipal taxpayers to show "a good-faith 
pocketbook action"). Consequently, plaintif fs cannot invoke 




Nor have plaintiffs established standing based on non- 
economic injuries suffered as a r esult of the challenged 
1999 display. The Millers provided substantial evidence 
regarding their contact with and r eaction to the 1998 
display. The Millers testified that they fr equently visit the 
municipal complex to fulfill personal, professional, and 
political responsibilities. Mrs. Miller PP 3-9 (App. at A17- 
A18); Mr. Miller I PP 3-14 (App. at A20-A21). Both saw the 
1998 holiday display and found it objectionable. Mrs. Miller 
PP 9-10 (App. at A18); Mr. Miller IPP 14-15 (App. at A22). 
Both were troubled by the display's placement near the 
entrance of the municipal building, the seat of the 
Township's government. Mrs. Miller P 10 (App. at A18); Mr. 
Miller I P 15 (App. at A22). 
 
Mr. Miller believed the 1998 display to be a 
demonstration by the Township "that it . . . has a special, 
close relationship with Christian religious institutions." Mr. 
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Miller I P 16 (App. at A22). He felt that"governmental 
entities . . . have no business erecting r eligious displays, let 
alone a religious display of only one r eligion in a place 
which is symbolic of the Township's power ." Mr. Miller I 
P 17 (App. at A22). He resented "the T ownship appearing to 
. . . act as a representative of the Catholic religion [of which 
he is an adherent] in erecting the Nativity display." Mr. 
Miller I P 18-19 (App. at A22). To him,"the display [was] an 
affront to and rejection of [his] political and philosophical 
beliefs and an intrusion into the area of [his] religion." Mr. 
Miller I P 20 (App. at A22). 
 
Similarly, Mrs. Miller interpreted the 1998 display as an 
endorsement of the Christian religion. Mrs. Miller P 10 
(App. at A18). As one who believes in the pr ohibition 
against establishment of religion, she found the display to 
be "an arrogant announcement that Wall Township is a 
Christian municipality--not one which is open to diversity 
and includes all of its residents on an equal basis." Mrs. 
Miller PP 11-12 (App. at A18-A19). Mor eover, as one who 
does not have a "religious background" but who is "not 
anti-religious," she "believe[s] that religion plays an 
important part in society and that our society should be 
tolerant of diverse religious philosophies and practices as 
well as those who choose not to practice any r eligion at all." 
Mrs. Miller P 13 (App. at A19). She viewed"the Township's 
Nativity display as both a rejection of [her] political views 
and of [her] beliefs respecting the necessity for religious 
diversity and inclusivity." Mrs. Miller P 14 (App. at A19). In 
conclusion, the display made her "feel less welcome in the 
community, less accepted and tainted in some way." Mrs. 
Miller P 15 (App. at A19). 
 
Before the Millers' suit was expanded to include the 1999 
display, the District Court found that this evidence 
sufficiently established the Millers' standing to raise their 
constitutional claims. The question is a close one. 
 
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc., the plaintiffs, 
"Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. 
. . . and four of its employees, learned of the conveyance [of 
federally-owned land in Pennsylvania to Valley Forge 
Christian College] through a news release." 454 U.S. at 
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469. The standing of the organization was dependent on 
that of the employee-plaintiffs, see id.  at 476 n.14, and the 
Supreme Court found that these named plaintif fs, who lived 
in Virginia and Maryland, see id.  at 487, lacked standing. 
The Court wrote: 
 
       Although respondents claim that the Constitution has 
       been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to 
       identify any personal injury suffered by them as a 
       consequence of the alleged constitutional err or, other 
       than the psychological consequence presumably 
       produced by observation of conduct with which one 
       disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer 
       standing under Art. III, even though the disagr eement 
       is phrased in constitutional terms. 
 
454 U.S. at 485-86 (emphasis added). 
 
The Court added: 
 
       We simply cannot see that respondents have alleged an 
       injury of any kind, economic or otherwise, sufficient to 
       confer standing. Respondents complain of a transfer of 
       property located in Chester County, Pa. The named 
       plaintiffs reside in Maryland and V irginia; their 
       organizational headquarters are located in Washington, 
       D.C. They learned of the transfer through a news 
       release. Their claim that the Government has violated 
       the Establishment Clause does not provide a special 
       license to roam the country in search of governmental 
       wrongdoing and to reveal their discoveries in federal 
       court. The federal courts were simply not constituted 
       as ombudsmen of the general welfare. 
 
454 U.S. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted). 
 
It can be argued that the Millers' alleged injuries from 
observance of the 1998 display--Mr. Miller's resentment, 
Mr. Miller I P 19 (App. at A22), and Mrs. Miller's feelings of 
being "less welcome in the community, less accepted and 
tainted in some way," Mrs. Miller P 15 (App. at A19)--are 
tantamount to the "psychological consequence[s] . . . 
produced by observation of conduct with which one 
disagrees," Valley Forge , 454 U.S. at 485, and that these 
psychological consequences are insufficient to establish 
standing. 
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Decisions of other circuits, however, suggest that the 
Millers' evidence might be sufficient to establish standing 
with respect to the 1998 display because, unlike the named 
plaintiffs in Valley Forge , the Millers had personal contact 
with the display. The Tenth Circuit, for example, found 
standing to challenge the religious element of a city logo 
displayed in the city hall, on city vehicles, and on city 
stationary where the plaintiff had "direct, personal contact" 
with the logo on a daily basis and was offended and 
intimidated by it. Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 
1485, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1989). Similarly, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that plaintiffs who felt like second class 
citizens because the city seal contained the wor d 
"Christianity" had standing to sue wher e they received 
correspondence and documents bearing the seal. Saladin v. 
City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 692-93 (11th Cir. 1987). 
Plaintiffs' "direct contact with the offensive conduct" served 
to distinguish the Eleventh Circuit plaintif fs from the 
plaintiffs in Valley Forge . Id. at 692. 
 
We need not decide whether the Millers' evidence would 
be sufficient to confer standing to challenge the 1998 
display, however, because plaintiffs do not press their 
challenge to that display on appeal. Plaintif fs seek relief 
only as to the modified display exhibited in 1999. 
 
We do not believe that the Millers' pr offered evidence 
would establish standing to challenge the 1999 display 
under the law of any circuit. The recor d contains no 
evidence that Mrs. Miller even saw the 1999 display. Cf. 
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486-87 (plaintiffs lived far from 
the challenged conveyance and learned of it through the 
media). While Mr. Miller testified that he went to the 
municipal complex and observed the Township's 1999 
display, it is unclear whether he did so in or der to describe 
the display for this litigation or whether, for example, he 
observed the display in the course of satisfying a civic 
obligation at the municipal building. Mr. Miller II PP 1-2 
(App. at A43); cf. Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 
1090 (4th Cir. 1997) (recognizing standing of plaintiff who, 
"as a participant in local government," had direct contact 
with a Ten Commandments display in county courtroom). 
Moreover, neither Mr. Miller nor Mrs. Miller provided 
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testimony regarding their reaction to the 1999 display, 
which was significantly different fr om the display in 1998. 
 
While we assume that the Millers disagreed with the 
1999 display for some reason, we cannot assume that the 
Millers suffered the type of injury that would confer 
standing. As noted, "the party invoking federal jurisdiction 
bears the burden of establishing [standing] . . . . in the 
same way as any other matter on which the plaintif f bears 
the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of 
evidence required at successive stages of the litigation." 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Mere assumption would not satisfy 
the plaintiffs' burden to prove an element of their cause of 
action at this stage of the litigation and it cannot satisfy 
their burden to prove standing. Accor dingly, we find that 
plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to challenge the 
Township's 1999 display. The order of the District Court is 
therefore vacated, and the case is r emanded for the District 
Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
While the lack of standing prevents plaintif fs from 
obtaining a ruling from a federal court r egarding the 
constitutionality of the Township's past display--which 
apparently will not be exhibited again--it does not prevent 
plaintiffs from attempting to challenge any future display 
that plaintiffs believe violates constitutional principles. 
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